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The colonial heritage of high land inequality in Latin American countries is still, after nearly two 
centuries of independence, one of the crucial underpinnings of its persistent high levels of income 
inequality. This paper assesses the colonial strategy of land redistribution in a global comparative 
perspective using new and existing land inequality figures in an OLS regression framework. The two 
central questions addressed are 1) what explains the cross-country variation in land inequality at the 
end of the colonial age? 2) how does initial land inequality relate to current income inequality? The 
main conclusions of the paper are that geography and factor endowments play a less decisive role than 
often argued in literature. And second, controlling for regional fixed effects, initial land inequality 
explains a substantial part of the present cross-country variation in current income inequality.  
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In order to explain the observed rigidities in the distribution of income recent inequality literature has 
paid renewed attention to the historical evolution of asset inequality (Atkinson and Bourguignon 
2000). This paper analyses the causes and consequences of the historical evolution of land inequality, 
employing a new dataset of land inequality figures. Land inequality is widely regarded as a key 
determinant of persistent asset inequality and institutional rigidity (Engerman and Sokoloff 1997, 
Galor et.al. 2003, North et. al. 2000).  
 
In Latin America the colonial heritage of land inequality has gradually transformed in 
persistent high levels of income inequality during the 20th century (World Bank 2004). For the 
Spanish Crown land was a convenient resource to reward the early colonists’ efforts of conquest, 
conversion and settlement. Land was deliberately redistributed from indigenous peasants to the Creole 
elite. The institution of the encomienda provided the large estates (latifundia) (and silver mines) with 
the necessary supplies of indigenous labour. With the establishment of distinct Spanish and Indian 
estates the policy of land distribution was also directed to separate the political, juridical and 
administrative spheres, creating a pervasive social dualism. In Brazil and the Caribbean this dualism 
was primarily shaped by the establishment of a plantation economy driven by African slave labour. 
The Catholic church materialized its position as the supreme religious authority by acquiring large 
estates. In other words, land inequality formed a core ingredient of the colonial institutional matrix 
(Bakewell 2004, Williamson 1992, Fernandez-Armesto 2003).  
 
With the Latin American experience in mind, this paper explores two questions: 1) what 
explains the cross-country variation in land inequality at the end of the colonial age? 2) how does 
initial land inequality relate to current income inequality? Exploring these questions may improve our 
understanding of the path-dependent characteristics of inequality and may also indicate to which 
extent the Latin American experience was a unique experience. As this paper relies on scarce 
historical data, the empirical analysis is carried out in a simple OLS framework. The regression results 
serve to illustrate, rather than demonstrate, the validity of the hypotheses derived from historical 
analysis. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 the literature on the causes and consequences 
of land inequality is discussed. Section 3 introduces the land distribution data (gini and theil 
coefficients) and evaluates these figures in a global comparative perspective. Section 4 presents the 
two multivariate regression models and the included variables. In section 5 the results are presented 





2 Literature on the causes and consequences of land inequality 
 
2.1 The causes of land inequality: colonial institutions in response to local factor 
endowments and the objectives of the European motherlands.  
The extent of land inequality developed during the colonial age is the result of the interaction between 
local conditions and overseas objectives. Literature has paid specific attention to the feasibility of 
settlement and exploitation in various regions of the world. Local conditions relate to the nature of 
land endowments (soil, climate, location), the relative quantity of land and labour endowments (land-
labour ratios, population density), the local disease environment and the comparative resistance of the 
native population to colonial occupation. When the local conditions meet the objectives of the 
colonial motherland, institutional development takes place as a response process. This brief overview 
of literature aims to discuss these institutional responses.     
 
1) Testing the hypothesis of Engerman and Sokoloff that “land endowments of Latin America lent 
themselves to commodities featuring economies of scale and the use of slave labour”, Easterly 
concludes that a natural environment suitable to cash-crop production is associated with high levels of 
income inequality in the long run (Easterly 2002; pp. 3-4, Engerman and Sokoloff 1997). Cash crops 
such as sugar, tobacco, coffee, cocoa, rubber and bananas can be efficiently produced on large estates 
employing cheap coerced labour. A coexistence of large estates focusing on the production of 
exportable cash-crops and small subsistence holdings concentrating on the production of food crops 
for the domestic market skews the distribution of land. (Leamer et. al. 1999, Easterly and Levine 
2003). Since tropical climates allow a larger variety of cash-crop production than temperate climates, 
the geographic location of a country may indirectly affect the distribution of land. A specialization in 
scale-neutral food crops has a moderating effect on land inequality. Before the introduction of modern 
agricultural technologies (motorized) food crops such as wheat and maize could be efficiently 
produced on plots of modest size, while rice crops could be grown on even smaller plots of land 
(Hayami and Ruttan 1985).    
 
The variety in land endowments induced different paths of colonisation in British North 
America, mainland Spanish America and the sugar plantation economies along the coast of Brazil and 
the Caribbean islands. Agriculture in British North America became organized around a homogenous 
group of white European farmers producing food crops (mainly wheat) on small to medium-scale 
farms. Contrary to the slave plantations in the Southern states, the egalitarian distribution of land in 
the Northern States fitted into a strategy to attract European settlers to the land frontier. In Spanish 
America on the other hand the main objective was to guarantee a steady supply of mineral resources 
(silver, gold, diamonds) to the Iberian Peninsula employing native labour. The British, French, Dutch 
and Portuguese plantation economies arose along with the Trans-Atlantic slave trade in the mid 17th 
century. In both cases a white minority elite held absolute authority in an ethnic heterogeneous 
society. The redistribution of land was part of a strategy to vest and remain in control.  
 
2) Apart from the nature of land endowments, the relative quantity of land and labour also shapes the 
potential efficiency of the rural economy. Land abundance invokes labour saving production methods 
and favours crops that use land intensively. The land-labour ratio also shapes institutional 
developments. Domar (1970) argues that in pre-modern agricultural societies, elites face the problem 
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of recruiting sufficient labour to toil their soil. In land abundant countries landless labourers have an 
opportunity to start farming at the land frontier. In response, the landowning elite tends to develop 
coercive labour market institutions, such as serfdom, slavery or permanent debt peonage (Domar 
1970, Demsetz 2000). An alternative strategy is to distribute (virgin) territories among the elite or 
restrict access to land of certain groups (indigenous farmers or landless labourers). In labour abundant 
countries on the other hand, elites dispose of more opportunities to extract rents from taxes and trade 
margins without having to intervene directly into the land market. All these arguments support the 
hypothesis that low levels of population density create incentives to regressively redistribute land, in 
particular in the context of the colonial society.    
 
3) Acemoglu et.al. (2001) argue that in areas unfavourable to colonial settlement, i.e. with a high 
disease incidence or fierce native resistance, colonial institutions will be created in order to maximize 
the extraction of resources from a distance. As a result the path of institutional development was 
characterised by weak property rights protection and a political context supporting rent seeking 
behaviour. In regions favourable to colonial settlement institutions were moulded according to the 
motherland with the purpose to accumulate capital and skills, enhancing economic growth during the 
age of independence. Settler mortality rates appear to be significantly correlated with present-day 
risks of expropriation.   
 
In Sub Saharan Africa the rates of colonial settlement were considerably lower than in the 
America’s and also more concentrated in the coastal regions. The colonial powers created institutions 
to extract rents via taxation (head tax) and trade in slaves and natural resources with high margins 
(Young 1994, Manning 1988). Since settlers did not directly interfere with the daily practices of 
agricultural production on a large scale, the traditional rural institutions were left in tact however. 
African slaves were shipped across the Atlantic in order to work on American plantations, rather than 
being put to work on African plantations (Stavrianos 1981, Eltis 2000, Ayittey 2005). High rates of 
settler mortality may have prohibited the redistribution of land.  
 
4) The conversion of Indians to Catholicism was a specific objective of Iberian colonial policy As a 
result of the strong pact between Rome and the Iberian monarchies against the backdrop of the 
Reformation in Europe, the Catholic church gained omni-presence in Iberian American society. The 
penetration of the regular and secular orders into the daily life of Amerindians went much further than 
Protestant missions were ever capable of. Lal (1998) points out, following Goody (1983), that the 
Catholic church devised specific inheritance laws in order to enlarge its landed estates and traded 
salvation and sacraments in return for (generous) gifts of its members. The concentration of land in 
the hands of the Catholic church’ may indeed have had a significant impact on the distribution of land 
(Van Oss 2003, Bakewell 2004).  
 
 
2.2 The relation between initial land inequality and current income inequality   
Land is the most important production factor and source of wealth in the pre-industrial economy. 
Since land generally depreciates at a much slower pace than most other forms of human, physical and 
natural capital and can, in principle, be accumulated without limitation, inequality can be easily 
passed on from one generation to the next in rural societies. Although the direct impact of land 
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inequality on income inequality diminishes as the share of agriculture in total GDP declines, indirect 
effects of land inequality (and landowning elites) may generate long run consequences for the 
distribution of income. Indirect effects consist of institutional rigidities enhancing the perpetuation of 
land inequality into several types of non-land asset inequality.    
 
Literature generally focuses on the (land) inequality-growth rather than the land inequality-
income inequality relationship. Several empirical studies have revealed that initial land inequality is 
bad for growth. This result appears to be stronger, more robust and less contested than tests showing 
that income inequality is bad for growth (Barro 2000, Easterly 2002, Helpman 2004). Using land 
gini’s around 1960 Birdsall and Londono (1997) show that the initial distribution of land is 
significantly negatively related to long run economic growth and this is confirmed by papers of 
Deininger and Squire (1998), Li, Squire and Zou (1998) and Deininger and Olinto (1999).  
 
One of the major theoretical underpinnings of this empirical observation is that land is an 
important collateral asset to get capital market access. In a context of imperfect capital markets, initial 
land inequality can pose barriers to individual entrepreneurship or investments in human capital 
(Galor and Zeira 1993). If public policy fails to remove capital market imperfections this not only 
hampers growth, but also leads to persistent asset and income inequality. In Hernando de Soto’s the 
Mystery of Capital (2000) this argument is developed with specific attention for the case of Latin 
America.  
 
Initial land inequality also enhances persistent inequality in a context of concentrated political 
power. If the political and landowning elite are largely overlapping policies that suppress democratic 
accountability and social development in order to preserve the distributional status quo are likely to 
prevail (Olson 2000, Bourguignon and Verdier 2000, Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). In comparison 
to the USA and Canada public education investments and franchise extensions lagged far behind 
Latin America (Engerman, Haber and Sokoloff 2001, Mariscal and Sokoloff 2000). Galor, Moav and 
Vollrath (2003) find empirical evidence for a negative effect of land inequality on public education 
expenditures in a cross-state US analysis and  Gylfason and Zoega (2002a, 2002b) report a positive 
relation between land and income inequality and a negative relation of both variables with secondary 
school enrolment rates in cross-country analyses.   
 
Theory clearly predicts a negative relation between initial land inequality and growth and a 
positive relationship between land and income inequality, ceteris paribus. It is therefore surprising that 
Deininger and Squire (1998) find a correlation of historical land gini’s (1960’s) and current income 
gini’s (1990’s) of just 0.39. (see also Deininger and Olinto 1999). Gylfason and Zoega (2002a and 
2002b) report an r of 0.33. The correlation-coefficients estimated in section 5 are even lower ranging 
from 0.19 to 0.23. If land inequality indeed is an important determinant of (persistent) income 
inequality, there will be some important conditional variables which need to be included in a 






3 Land inequality in a global comparative perspective     
Land distribution data are scarce. Taylor and Hudson (1972: pp. 267-269) present a dataset consisting 
of gini-coefficients of land distribution of 54 different countries in some year close to 1960. More 
recently Deininger and Squire (1998) used a dataset of 261 gini-coefficients of 103 different 
countries, of which so far 60 observations around the year 1960 have been published in a paper by 
Deininger and Olinto (1999: pp. 24). The data are derived from the FAO World Census of 
Agriculture.1 The dataset I constructed for this paper is based on census data from the International 
Institute of Agriculture (IIA) and the FAO. The estimates of land inequality are presented in table A.1 
(appendix) including the figures of Taylor and Hudson and Deininger and Olinto (T&H and D&O 
hereafter). The Frankema dataset consists of 186 observations for 105 different countries, including a 
considerable amount of pre-war estimates. The figures are expressed in gini- and theil-coefficients 
(correlation r = 0.98).  Table 1 presents the correlation between the three datasets and shows that the 
D&O and Frankema data are stronger related than any of these two with the T&H data.  
 
Table 1: Correlation of three datasets of land gini’s around 1960   
 Taylor & Hudson Deininger & Olinto Frankema 
Taylor & Hudson 1   
Deininger & Olinto 0,79 1  
Frankema 0,78 0,90 1 
 
Sources: Taylor and Hudson (1972: pp. 267-269), Deininger and Olinto (2001: pp. 24), appendix table A.1 
  
The Frankema figures are compiled according to decile distributions of the total number of 
land holdings2 (farms), and the total amount of agricultural land, excluding communal pastures and 
forests. An example calculus is presented in the appendix table A.2. The concepts and definitions 
applied in the agricultural surveys of the FAO are rather consistent over time and across countries. In 
order to further improve the spatial and temporal comparability of the land inequality figures I 
implemented some extra criteria: circa 60 surveys with an incomplete coverage of agricultural land or 
an incomplete coverage of land holdings were excluded.3 Around one-third of these were excluded 
because surveys did not make a distinction between communal land holdings and single private land 
                                                     
1 This census has been initiated in 1924 by the International Institute of Agriculture (IIA) in Rome, the 
predecessor of the FAO. The census has been carried out each decade since the 1930’s, with the exception of the 
1940’s.  
2 “Land holding” refers to the disposable amount of land per farm, which is not the same as the land owned by 
the farmer. Land property is generally more unequally distributed than land holdings, depending on the share of 
land under tenure. The distribution of land holdings therefore serves as a lower benchmark of the ownership 
distribution. The distribution of land holdings is a clear analytical concept as it captures the “access” to land as a 
production factor. A limitation of both concepts is that differences in land quality are not taken into account and 
there is little that can be done to correct this.   
3 a) Some surveys only include cropland and exclude pastureland. Usually this sample bias applies to countries 
with a minimal share of pastureland or, countries in which pastures are part of communal estates and therefore 
not subject to a personal distribution measure. FAO statistics also provide statistics on crop and livestock 
production, which enables an evaluation of the validity of the surveys that are exclusively based on cropland. In 
Chad and Botswana the exclusion of pastures in the sample lead to a misrepresentation of livestock production 
and these countries are therefore excluded from the data set. Also Madagascar and Malawi are excluded because 
of incomplete coverage. b) In some cases farms are differentiated into traditional indigenous household holdings 
and European holdings, reflecting the traditional colonial categorisation of land holdings. Surveys taking only 
one category into account will underestimate actual land inequality For this reason Zimbabwe and Tanzania a.o. 
are excluded. For Zambia (1960) and Congo (1990) one observation is rejected, yet an alternative observation is 
accepted.  
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holdings. Indeed, the estimated land gini’s of socialist Eastern European countries in the 1970’s and 
1980’s display extreme land inequality since private small-holders and communal holdings are both 
counted as individual farm holdings. In fact, these gini’s do not properly reflect the inequality of 
“access” to land.4  
 
The selected sample includes 111 country observations5  for a year close to independence: for 
the majority of Asian and African countries this is an observation close to 1960; for non-colonised 
countries and most New World countries it is the earliest observation available. As temporal changes 
in land inequality remain confined in most countries6 and the pre-war figures precede most of the 
considerable structural changes in land distribution during the 20th century I regard this sample as the 
most reliable proxy of historical land inequality, given the data available. Historical evidence for 
Latin American countries suggests that land inequality did not fundamentally change during the 19th 
and 20th centuries, which is illustrated by the time-series data for Argentina, Brazil and Chile in table 
A.1. For the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand there are early observations available 
(respectively 1880, 1931, 1910 and 1910).7  
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample subdivided by 13 world regions. The 
descriptive statistics reveal some interesting stylized facts. First of all, the extraordinary high levels of 
land inequality observed in Latin American countries appear to be a coherent regional feature. The top 
twenty of the world’s land inequality distribution contains no less than 16 Latin American countries! 
The intra-regional variation is, with the exception of the Caribbean islands, smaller than anywhere 
else in the world. The assertion that there is a “Latin” type of inequality (World Bank 2004) is indeed 
supported by a global comparison of land inequality. In Europe the countries with the most unequal 
distribution of land are Spain, Portugal and Italy. It is quite remarkable that land inequality in the 
former Iberian colonial motherlands is as high as in an average Latin American country. 
 
The four East Asian countries are among the world’s most egalitarian. Ranking all land gini’s 
from low to high, South Korea ranks 2nd, Taiwan 9th, Japan 12th and China 20th. Except China, these 
East Asian countries are known for having realised “growth with equity” and it is often argued that, 
by dismantling the power of landowning elites, land reforms have paved the way for a relatively 
equitable distribution of assets and income. The steep drop in the Taiwanese land gini (from 53.9 in 
1920 to 39.0 in 1960, see Appendix table A.1) illustrates the impact of land reforms carried out under 
Japanese colonial rule (Fei, Ranis and Kuo 1979, Frankema and Smits 2005).   
 
 
                                                     
4 In the Deininger and Olinto paper former socialist Eastern European countries are excluded, but in the study 
by Deininger and Squire (1998) the East European land gini’s are used in an inequality-growth analysis which 
undoubtedly impacts on the results. 
5 From Deininger and Olinto (2001) I included figures for Bolivia, Madagascar, Mexico and Tanzania and from 
Taylor and Hudson (1972) I included figures for Luxembourg and Libya.   
6 Li, Squire and Zou (1998) concluded from an analysis of variance that over 90% of the variation in land 
inequality is due to cross-country variation and less than 10% due to within-country temporal variation. 
7 For the USA (independency 1776) and Canada (1867) I compared the figures with the inequality-index 
constructed by Adelman and Taft Morris (1988) for the year 1850. Land gini’s of 47,0 (USA) and 48,7 (Canada) 
fit rather well into their conclusions on the wealth distribution of both countries. Perhaps the estimates are a 
little too high, almost certainly not too low. The 1880 USA estimate is derived from Galor, Moav and Vollrath 
(2003). The authors kindly provided me with their data.    
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of land gini’s subdivided by 13 world regions.  
 min max median mean st.dev cv obs 
South America 63.9 86.3 80.4 79.9 6.3 0.08 11 
Central America 60.7 78.3 73.9 72.3 6.0 0.08 7 
Caribbean 46.2 81.6 69.9 68.1 11.8 0.17 7 
        
East Asia 30.7 43.8 39.5 38.4 5.5 0.14 4 
South Asia 41.8 62.3 55.4 53.7 8.7 0.16 6 
South East Asia 29.1 68.0 47.3 47.9 11.7 0.24 8 
        
North Africa and Middle East 56.3 82.0 63.8 65.1 7.3 0.11 12 
South & East Africa 36.8 83.5 66.7 62.7 17.4 0.28 12 
West & Central Africa 31.2 68.1 45.2 45.2 9.1 0.20 14 
        
Western Offshoots 47.0 78.6 61.1 61.9 16.4 0.26 4 
Western Europe 47.0 79.1 63.4 63.9 10.1 0.16 14 
Eastern Europe 39.2 60.0 52.4 51.0 9.5 0.19 4 
Scandinavia 42.1 63.3 47.2 49.3 7.5 0.15 8 
        
World 29.1 86.3 60.0 59.7 15.0 0.25 111 
 
Notes: East Asia: China, Japan, Korea. Rep, Taiwan; South Asia: Bangladesh, India, Iran, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka; South East Asia: Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam. 
North Africa & Middle East: Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Syria, 
Tunisia, Turkey; East & South Sub Saharan Africa: Botswana, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Kenya, Lesotho, Reunion, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia; West & Central Sub 
Saharan Africa: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Rep., Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, 
Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Uganda; Western Offshoots: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, USA; 
Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, UK; Eastern Europe: Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovenia, Yugoslavia.   
 
 
Perhaps the most remarkable stylized fact is the clear intra-regional difference in Africa. 
North Africa and the Middle East boast relatively high levels of land inequality. The distribution of 
land in Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia and South Africa is highly unequal, while in Mali, Burkina Faso, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Niger and Senegal land gini’s are considerably lower than the world’s average of 59.7. 
In many, mostly West and Central African countries land inequality appears to be confined, and taken 




4 A multivariate regression analysis.  
The hypotheses discussed in section 2 are specified in a simple cross-country OLS model. The first 
equation considers the explanation of cross-country variation in post-colonial land inequality:  
 
y = α + β1 x1’ + β2 x2’ + ε                    
 
where y refers to post-colonial land inequality, α is a constant and ε is an error term. The 
vectors x1 and x2 respectively capture the impact of colonial factor endowments and the specific 
objectives of the motherland on land inequality. The second equation considers the explanation of 
cross-country variation in current national income inequality levels:   
 
z = α + δ1y  + δ2 (y * g) + δ3m + δ4x4’  + ε  
 
where z refers to current income inequality, α is a constant, ε is an error term, y refers to land 
inequality, g represents the level of economic development, capturing the direct effect of land 
inequality on income inequality. The m refers to a measure of the dominance of mineral resources in 
exports and vector x4 represents regional fixed effects.  
 
4.1 The determinants of land inequality: endowments and institutions  
Several proxies for the feasibility of tropical cash-crop production can be used. One rough variable is 
the mean annual temperature (MEANTEMP) (McArthur and Sachs 2001).  Easterly (2002) applies 
variables of “land use” (percentage share of land yielding a specific crop) and “land suitability” 
(percentage share of land suitable to the cultivation of a specific crop). Since the use of land may be 
endogenous to the distribution of land, the land suitability indicator is preferable. The FAO provides 
data on land suitability for a.o. bananas, cotton, maize, rice, sugarcane and wheat. For coffee, cocoa, 
rubber and tobacco only land use data is available. Land use data are transformed into dummies of 
land suitability. If a country devotes over 1% of their agricultural land to one of these crops and has a 
historical record as a net exporter of one of these crops (Mitchell 2003), the dummy is set at 1. Cash 
crops (bananas, coffee, cocoa, cotton, rubber, tobacco and sugar) are expected to yield a positive 
effect, food crops (maize, rice and wheat) are expected to yield a negative effect. The crops are also 
included as an aggregate measure: the CASHCROP aggregate includes bananas, cotton and sugar and 
the FOODCROP aggregate includes maize, rice and wheat. The land labour ratio is approximated by 
the log of population per square kilometre of agricultural land in the early colonial period 
(LNPOPDENSE). For most New World countries the year 1700 or 1800 is used. For African 
countries and most Asian countries the year 1900 is used. Square kilometres of agricultural area are 
from Taylor and Hudson (1972: pp. 303-305) and population estimates for 1700, 1800 and 1900 are 
from McEvedy and Jones (1978).  
 
The hypothesis that European colonial rule has interfered in the distribution of land is 
accounted for by a dummy variable (EURCOL DUMMY) with a value 1 for each former European 
colony. The special conditions in the Iberian colonies, i.e. the institutions of the encomienda and 
latifundia, the authoritarian political and stratified social order are accounted for by another dummy 
variable (IBERCOL DUMMY). The log of historical settler mortality rates is included as a proxy for 
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settler conditions of colonial settlement (LNSETMORT). The data are taken from Acemoglu et.al. 
(2001). For countries that have not been subject to European colonial settlement the mortality rate is 
set at zero. The impact of the Catholic church on the distribution of land is covered by inserting the 
log of the percentage share of Catholics (LNCATHOLICISM) in a year close to 1965 (Taylor and 
Hudson 1972).    
 
4.2 The effect of land inequality on income inequality in a regression with fixed effects 
Income inequality figures are derived from the World Income Inequality Database (UNU/WIDER 
WIID version 1.0). The sample consists of high-quality gini-coefficients with a national coverage for 
the latest year available in the period 1987-1998 for 95 countries.8 The land inequality variable 
(LANDGINI) is represented by the land gini’s discussed above (section 4). The log of GDP per capita 
in 1990 (LNGDPPC) (Maddison 2003) is included as an interaction term to separate the direct effect 
from the indirect effect of land inequality on income inequality.     
  
To control for other sources of inequality a variable is included which captures the impact of 
mineral resource dominance in exports. Isham et.al. (2003) provide point-source estimates of mineral 
resource abundance as the percentage share of one or two minerals dominating national exports. 
Mineral resources include crude petrol, gas, coal, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, ivory, diamonds, 
pearls and wood.9 The variable is specified in log and denoted as LNMINERALS. Regional fixed 
effects are accounted for by including dummy variables for Latin America, Sub Saharan Africa, Asia 






                                                     
8 These are the criteria: income gini’s are preferred over expenditure gini’s, net income over gross income 
estimates and household income over personal income. For ca. half of the countries only expenditure gini’s are 
available for the 1990’s, which are increased with 5 percentage points to correct for potential underestimation of 
actual income inequality. I did not correct for gross to net income or personal to household income. In case there 
was more than one observation to choose from the average is calculated and included. Additionally included 
countries are: Argentina and Uruguay with an urban income gini, Barbados with an income gini for 1979, 
Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago and Cyprus with a low-quality income gini, and finally Mozambique with an 
income gini derived from the CIA (2005) World Fact Book, (www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/).     
9 Three observations for Guinea, Guyana and Libya were included on the basis of UN Trade Statistics. 
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5 Results and interpretation 
A spatial regression analysis employing scattered data, rough proxy variables and large time lags 
cannot do much more than illustrate rather than to demonstrate the validity of the historical analysis. 
The analysis may give a plausible indication however which are the most fruitful paths for further 
research. In table A.3 and A.4 (appendix) the descriptive statistics and pair-wise correlations of the 
variables are presented. Table 3 reports ordinary least square regressions of land inequality.  
 
The hypothesis that tropical climates are related to land inequality can not be sustained. The 
mean annual temperature variable does have a positive sign but is completely insignificant (1). 
Moreover, none of the food or cash crop variables yields a significant result (2). Although the 
aggregate cash crop and food crop variable have the predicted signs, positive and negative 
respectively, both variables are insignificant. The hypothesis that countries with substantial sources of 
land suitable to the production of cash crops have a more unequal distribution of land cannot be 
sustained on the basis of this analysis and this does not have to come as a great surprise. Large parts 
of West and Central Sub Saharan Africa are suitable to the production of cash crops but do not reveal 
high levels of land inequality. Land abundant countries are clearly characterised by higher levels of 
land inequality than densely populated countries. The sign is consistent but the coefficient is not 
robust. The null-hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 90% confidence level in most regressions, except 
6 and 8.     
 
Former European colonies display significantly higher levels of land inequality and this effect 
is even stronger for former Iberian colonies. The significance of the Iberian colony dummy supports 
the view that typical “Latin” colonial institutions, such as the encomienda, had an inherent enhancing 
effect on land inequality, apart from the colonies endowments structure. Controlled by the European 
colony dummy, the redistribution of land under Iberian colonial rule indeed appears to be a distinctive 
element of its colonial policy.    
 
Settler conditions also seem to make a substantial difference. The log of setter mortality rates, 
as a proxy for settler conditions, is consistently negative and significant at a 95%-99% confidence 
level. In colonies with favourable settler conditions average land inequality is higher. It is, moreover, 
noteworthy that the European colony dummy is only significant when controlled for settler mortality 
rates (7). This evidence indeed suggests that the conditions of settlement are an ultimate cause of land 
inequality which probably also have been decisive in shaping the nature of long run income inequality 





Table 3: OLS Regressions; dependent variable is the land inequality (gini-coefficient) 
observation closest to the year of independence.   
 Gini Gini Gini Gini Gini Gini Gini Gini Theil 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Meantemp 0,002         
 (0,003)         
Bananas   -0,524        
   (0,71)        
Cotton   -0,056        
   (0,59)        
Sugar   0,784        
   (0,71)        
Cocoa dummy   0,004        
   (0,04)        
Coffee dummy   0,036        
   (0,03)        
Rubber dummy   -0,014        
   (0,05)        
Tobacco dummy   0,010        
   (0,03)        
Maize   0,165        
   (0,45)        
Rice   -0,171        
   (0,11)        
Wheat   -0,04        
   (0,16)        
Cash crop 
aggregate    0,125  0,125     
    (0,20)  (0,20)     
Food crop 
aggregate    -0,086  -0,105     
    (0,07)  (0,06)     
lnPopdense -0,011 -0,004 -0,005 -0,011  -0,016 -0,012 -0,015  
 (0,01) (0,01) (0,01) (0,01)  (0,01)** (0,01) (0,01)**  
Eurcol dummy 0,146 0,176 0,148 0,128 0,115 0,163 0,013 0,138 0,138 
 (0,07)** (0,07)** (0,06)** (0,06)** (0,06)** (0,06)*** (0,03) (0,06)** (0,06)** 
Ibercol dummy 0,103 0,083 0,113 0,122 0,120  0,097 0,181 0,138 
 (0,04)** (0,05)* (0,04)*** (0,04)*** (0,04)***  (0,04)** (0,04)*** (0,04)*** 
lnSetmort -0,040 -0,039 -0,035 -0,032 -0,034 -0,032  -0,038 -0,031 
 (0,01)*** (0,01)*** (0,01)*** (0,01)*** (0,01)** (0,01)**  (0,01)*** (0,01)*** 
lnCatholicism 0,030 0,027 0,028 0,026 0,029 0,039 0,024  0,026 
 (0,01)*** (0,01)*** (0,01)*** (0,01)*** (0,01)*** (0,01)*** (0,01)***  (0,01)** 
C 0,602 0,561 0,588 0,636 0,527 0,656 0,630 0,733 0,509 
                    
R-squared 0,53 0,58 0,55 0,52 0,54 0,45 0,35 0,46 0,49 
no. Obs 75 76 76 79 81 79 95 79 84 
 
Notes: All regressions are OLS. Standard errors between parentheses. Dependent variable of regressions 1 to 8 is a Gini-coefficient of land 
distribution; in regression 9 a Theil-coefficient. Significance-levels are reported as *** < 1%, **< 5% and *< 10%. For details on the 
dependent and explanatory variables see section 3 and 4.  
 
 
Finally, the presence of the Catholic church also appears to have contributed to land 
inequality. The spread of Catholicism is positively related to land inequality at a 95%-99% confidence 
level. This effect is maintained even when the ultimate control variable, the Iberian colony dummy, is 
included. The rapid diffusion and sustained omni-presence of the Catholic church further supports the 
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view that the objectives of the Iberian mother countries have played a decisive role, apart from the 
local conditions the Iberian settlers were confronted with. 
   
 In sum, a typical “land unequal” country at the start of its independence is a land 
abundant Catholic country, which has comparatively favourable settler conditions and specific Iberian 
institutions. Such a description indeed comes remarkably close to the “average” Latin American 
country. This impression arises from a global sample (covering all regions) including a dummy for 
Iberian colonies. The nature and structure of factor endowments do not play a decisive role, but 
provided a context in which redistribution of land was more or less likely to take place. The West 
African conditions to produce cash crops such as sugar were probably comparable to those in the 
Caribbean and Brazil, but Europeans could not enforce access into this area as easy as in Latin 
America. The objectives of European mother countries were therefore really constrained by settler 
conditions in general, local endowments were important in second instance.    
In areas with unfavourable settler conditions, colonists adhered to a type of rent seeking 
behaviour that may have suppressed the rural economy as a whole due to the burden of taxes, but did 
not affect the existing distribution of land. The redistribution of land from natives to colonists was 
part of a colonial policy with extractive and developmental objectives. The expropriation of land and 
the exploitation of forced labour served extractive purposes, but investments in the local economy in 
order to raise the profitability of agricultural production served developmental purposes. Current 
levels of income inequality in Latin America and Sub Saharan Africa are among the highest in the 
world but the characteristics and sources of inequality differ distinctively.  
 
Let’s now turn to the consequences of land inequality for income inequality. Table 4 presents 
the correlation-coefficients of early post-colonial land inequality figures and current income 
inequality figures (1990’s). The results range from 0,19 (land gini) to 0,23 (land theil). Excluding the 
Sub Saharan African countries from the sample (second column) shows that the coefficient rises with 
approximately 0.3 points to 0,49-0,52. Since the far majority of Sub Saharan African countries are 
low-income rural countries one would expect the direct effect of land inequality on income inequality 
to be comparatively large, yet the high levels of income inequality observed in Sub Saharan Africa do 
not correspond to its relatively low levels of land inequality.  
 
Table 4: Correlation of land and income inequality (pairwise) 
 
Income Gini  
1990’s 
Income Gini 1990’s 
excl. West & Central  Africa 
Land Gini 0,19 0,49 
Land Theil  0,23 0,52 




Table 5: OLS Regressions with regional fixed effects: dependent variable is income inequality in 
the 1990’s 
  1 2 3 4 
Landgini 1,042  0,394  
 (0,13)***  (0,014)***  
Landgini*lnGDPpc -0,234  -0,094  
 (0,03)***  (0,037)**  
Landtheil   1,631  0,572 
   (0,24)***  (0,25)** 
Landtheil*lnGDPpc   -0,404  -0,146 
   (0,06)***  (0,06)** 
lnMinerals    0,031 0,036 
    (0,03) (0,03) 
Asia    4,486 4,576 
    (2,3)*** (2,2)** 
Latin America    12,19 12,17 
    (2,2)*** (2,6)*** 
Sub Saharan Africa    11,97 13,28 
    (2,8)*** (2,5)*** 
Socialist     -4,800 -4,653 
    (2,4)*** (2,4)** 
C 31,27 37,57 33,55 35,16 
          
R-squared 0,44 0,37 0,66 0,65 
no. Obs 93 87 92 86 
 
Notes: All regressions are OLS. Standard errors between parentheses. Dependent variable of regressions 1 to 4 
is a Gini-coefficient of income distribution. Significance-levels are reported by *** < 1%, ** < 5% and * < 
10%. For details on the dependent and explanatory variables see section 3 and 4.  
 
Apparently the link between unfavourable settler conditions, extractive institutions and high 
income inequality does not run via high land inequality. This is a crucial distinction with the evolution 
of inequality in Latin American societies, where land inequality is an important source of economic 
inequality and large estate holders have vested interests in the agricultural sector. African extractive 
institutions are often directed at squeezing rural surpluses by land or rural income taxes or agricultural 
price manipulation, disadvantaging the rural population in favour of the politically more influential 
urban population (Krueger, Schiff and Valdez 1991, Cheru 2002).  
 
The results of the fixed effects OLS regressions of income inequality are presented in table 5, 
including the landgini and the landtheil. The relation between initial land inequality and subsequent 
income inequality appears to be very strong when controlling for mineral resource exports and 
regional fixed effects (3 and 4). A change in the landgini of 10 percentage points (3) translates into a 
rise of the income gini by 3.9 points. If Brazil would have the Canadian level of land inequality (a 
landgini of 0.49 in stead of 0.78), the model predicts that Brazil’s income gini would decline with 11 
percentage points to 0.47 in stead of 0.58. The regression results also support the relevance of the 
distinction between a direct effect and indirect effect of land inequality on income inequality. The 
direct effect of land inequality, captured by including the interaction term (log of GDP per capita), is 
smaller in more developed economies. The regression results support the view that land inequality has 
a long lasting positive impact on income inequality, but the example of Sub Saharan Africa (table 4) 
shows that we should consider it as a specific rather than a comprehensive proxy for historical levels 
of inequality. The remaining question is in which respect land inequality makes a difference?      
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6 The consequences of land inequality: distributive conflicts and development 
In their recent book The Economic Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship (2006) Acemoglu and 
Robinson argue that distributive conflicts between “elites” and “citizens” play a key role in the 
development of political institutions. The authors presume an initial state in which the elite (initially) 
disposes of greater political and economic power than the majority of common people (citizens). 
Consequently, the various paths societies follow in the transfer of power from the elite to the citizens 
(i.e. democratisation) are analysed. One of the determinants of this process is the source of income of 
the elite. In the light of this simple dual framework, one can ask what the specific consequences for 
the nature of distributive conflicts are if the elites are primarily “landowning elites”, facing a majority 
of citizens that are poor landless labourers or small subsistence holders. The consequences may be 
divided into those obstructing  development and those supporting development.        
  
Obstructing development   
1) The issue of the persistent effects of land inequality on non-land assets has already been raised in 
section 2. In a context of capital market imperfections initial land inequality leads to underinvestment 
in and an unequal distribution of non-land assets, particularly human capital. Public investments in 
education may compensate for suboptimal investments in and access to schooling. However, public 
education expenditures require public revenues which induces a redistribution of income from the 
landowning elite to landless citizens. Besides, in land abundant countries, landowning elites have a 
special interest in a steady supply of cheap unskilled labour. Therefore, landowning elites have 
several reasons to oppose the expansion of public education (Galor and Zeira 1993, Mariscal and 
Sokoloff 2000, Galor et.al. 2003).    
 
2) In a pre-industrial economy land inequality may obstruct industrialization via the demand side. If 
the gains of agricultural productivity increases or export expansion (for instance during the golden age 
in Latin America between 1870-1914) are adversely distributed to the landowners at the expense of 
the landless labourers, the purchasing power of the landless poor remains limited. The more the 
growth of middle class demand for basic industrial products is reduced, the harder it is to generate 
economies of scale. In a pre-industrial society land inequality may therefore lead to suboptimal 
consumer demand spillovers depressing the rise of domestically oriented basic industries (Kay 2001, 
Murphy et.al. 1989). 
 
3) Land is a specific source of income for the elites. In comparison to elites whose sources of income 
are based on physical and human capital, landowners may have extra reasons to oppose institutional 
changes leading to a transfer of power to the majority (i.e. democratisation). Acemoglu and Robinson 
mention three differences (2006: pp. 32): Land is easier to tax than other assets; social and political 
instability may be more damaging to owners of physical and human capital (relying on cooperation in 
the workplace and the trading process) than landowners; and landowners may have different 
preferences of economic institutions (related to coercive rural labour market institutions) than the 
majority (see also Engerman and Sokoloff 2005).  
 
Supporting development  
1) The landowning elite has a specific interest in the development of the agricultural (exports) sector. 
Elites insist on necessary public investments in physical and commercial infrastructure needed to 
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expand their business. These investments  generate spillover effects. If the landowning aristocracy is 
in the exclusive position to decide, many problems of collective action are circumvented and the 
effectiveness of public investments and potential spill over effects increase (Johnson 1991).    
 
2) In comparison to elites whose sources of income are exclusively based on their position in a 
predatory state bureaucracy, landowners may have extra reasons to support a process of 
democratisation. If the elites’ income exclusively depends on rent seeking behaviour backed by a 
monopoly on coercive power (violence) its economic and political position are inextricably 
intertwined. In such a context political concessions to the majority come at extremely high costs, 
which is likely to result in an “all or nothing” game (i.e. armed conflicts). The political and economic 
position of a landowning elite can, in principle, be separated if a credible and sustainable protection of 
their property rights is negotiated. This creates an opening for the development of participative 
political institutions and urban entrepreneurship. The adverse long run effect of extractive colonial 
institutions is, indeed, that it has destroyed the basis for such cooperation among contesting social (or 
ethnic) groups.     
 
3) Related to the former argument, the presence of a powerful landowning elite will, in the course of a 
democratisation process, prevent an outright squeeze of rural citizens through taxes and food price 
manipulation in favour of the politically more influential urban citizens. If elites have a stake in the 
rural sector (where they hold their assets, derive their labour force and have an important social 
role/standing), as well as the urban economy (on which they depend for commercial and transport 
services and supplies of industrial products), there is a geographic balance of interests. Without such 
balancing forces, the roots of long run economic development that grow in the fertile soil of a certain 
base level of agricultural prosperity, may fall prey to a rent seeking urban elite operating under short-





In this paper a new dataset of land inequality is introduced in order to explore the causes and 
consequences of land distribution in a global comparative perspective. The two central questions 
addressed are 1) what explains the cross-country variation in land inequality at the end of the colonial 
period? 2) how does initial land inequality relate to current income inequality? The main argument of 
this paper is that post-colonial levels of land inequality are largely determined by the response of 
colonists to local endowments (land, people, climate and soil) and settler conditions (disease 
environment, local resistance). An account of the colonial origins of inequality provides some crucial 
insights in the long run consequences of land distribution for economic inequality in general and the 
nature of distributive conflicts in particular.  
 
On the determinants of land inequality the following can be concluded. The suitability of 
colonial land to the production of scale intensive tropical cash crops enhanced the deliberate 
redistribution of land only in so far these geographic conditions were complemented by favourable 
settler conditions (disease environment and resistance of natives) and a guaranteed supply of 
indigenous or imported (slave) labour. In response to these local conditions and the specific objectives 
of the European colonial powers a varied pattern of colonial institutions evolved. This institutional 
variety can be evaluated on the basis of its relative extractive or developmental content. With respect 
to the regressive redistribution of land from natives to settlers a threefold categorization appears:   
  
1) Extractive institutions prevailed in areas with unfavourable settler conditions (large parts of Sub 
Saharan Africa, in particular Central and West Africa). In these areas colonists did not intervene 
directly into the production process, but concentrated their rent seeking efforts on collecting taxes, 
and engage in the trade and exploitation of natural resources and slaves. Consequently, little direct 
intervention in land markets and traditional rural institutions took place.  
2) In regions with favourable settler conditions colonists became directly involved in the production 
process and the factor markets. In settler colonies without suitable conditions to produce cash-crops 
using indigenous labour or slave labour, the cultivation of land for food crops mainly depended on 
European immigration (British North America). In these areas the creation of developmental 
institutions reflected an interest of settlers to attract immigrants to the land frontier, to accumulate 
capital and skills and to evenly distribute resources (such as land) in line with a relative homogenous 
social order.  
3) In settler colonies where the cultivation of cash crops was feasible European colonists directed their 
efforts at guaranteeing a stable supply of indigenous or African slave labour to work the land (and 
silver mines) (large parts of Latin America and the Caribbean). In these areas coercive institutions 
such as slavery and serfdom evolved to control the labour force and economically reinforce a 
fundamentally heterogeneous social order. The unequal distribution of land formed a cornerstone of 
such a colonial strategy. 
 
On top of these determinants there are clear indications that specific Iberian colonial 
institutions contributed to high land inequality in Latin America. More than in any other region the 
Catholic church acquired the status of supreme religious authority. The accumulation of land was part 
of a deliberate policy of the church to express and consolidate this unique position. And second, in 
Spain and Portugal landownership was the exclusive and ultimate key to social mobility and the 
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acquisition of (noble) titles, more than in other European motherlands. Indeed, in the land inequality 
figures of both mother countries the traits of medieval feudalism are still visible.   
 
What about the consequences of land inequality for long run distribution and development? 
Controlling for the level of economic development it turns out that the impact of land inequality has to 
be separated in a direct effect (the share of rural inequality in total inequality) and an indirect effect 
related to path dependent effects of initial land inequality on the distribution of non-land assets. Given 
the large weight of the rural sector in low developed countries, one would expect that the relation 
between land and income inequality would be strongest in Sub Saharan African countries. The 
empirical analysis presented in this paper points out the opposite however. This surprising conclusion 
reveals an important difference between the colonial heritage of West and Central Africa versus Latin 
America.  
 
Both regions are characterised by abundant endowments of land suitable to the production of 
cash crops. In Latin America a powerful landowning elite developed under three centuries of colonial 
rule. During the first wave of globalisation in the last quarter of the 19th century this elite was able to 
consolidate and probably even enhance its position, as the agricultural export sector expanded. West 
and Central African income inequality in the second half of the 20th century is based on a systematic 
squeeze of the rural majority population in favour of a small predatory urban elite. This type of 
inequality is rooted in the weak protection of property rights in unstable independent “states without 
nations”. Both regions carry the burden of “disproportional” levels of economic inequality. Those in 
power want to hold on to what they have and feel threatened by demands for accountability. Yet, the 
incentives shaping the attitude and actions of the elites in both regions differ fundamentally.     
 
 A landowning elite not only derives income from rent extraction, but also from the 
accumulation of capital and investments in agricultural enterprise. If landowners see opportunities to 
defend their stakes in economic development and are able to negotiate credible and sustainable 
protection of property rights, they may be willing to lift their bans on institutional change and a 
transfer of power to other social groups. They may also allow for the development of an urban class of 
entrepreneurs competing for (scarce) sources of cheap labour. If the stakes of the elite are primarily 
vested in the consolidation of a predatory bureaucracy, the economic and political position of the elite 
are maximal overlapping. In this context a transfer of power or the development of new sectors poses 
such a severe threat to the distributive status quo, that the elites are willing to bear the very high costs 
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1 Algeria 1930 59,6 0,326   
2 Algeria 1973 63,5 0,327   
3 Argentina 1914 80,3 0,648   
4 Argentina 1947 80,6 0,648   
5 Argentina 1960 81,4 0,667 86,7 85,6 
6 Argentina 1988 81,4 0,645   
7 Australia 1910 73,4 0,489   
8 Australia 1924 67,6 0,376   
9 Australia 1960 82,0 0,651 88,2 85,3 
10 Australia 1971 80,5 0,612   
11 Austria 1930 68,4 0,408   
12 Austria 1960 67,1 0,386 70,7 68,8 
13 Austria 1990 61,2 0,314   
14 Bangladesh 1960    41,8 
15 Bangladesh 1977 41,7 0,138   
16 Barbados 1961 81,6 0,795   
17 Barbados 1989 84,8 0,804   
18 Belgium 1930 75,9 0,544   
19 Belgium 1959 60,0 0,276 60,4  
20 Belgium 1970 57,8 0,255   
21 Bolivia 1960    76,8 
22 Brazil 1920 78,0 0,592   
23 Brazil 1960 78,7 0,608 84,5 84,1 
24 Brazil 1985 80,2 0,632   
25 Burkina Faso 1993 39,1 0,112   
26 Cameroon 1972 40,7 0,120   
27 Canada 1931 48,7 0,183   
28 Canada 1961 52,6 0,212  55,1 
29 Central African Rep. 1974 33,8 0,082   
30 Chile 1927 83,7 0,746   
31 Chile 1965 86,5 0,823   
32 Chile 1997 84,1 0,752   
33 China 1997 43,8 0,179   
34 Colombia 1960 80,5 0,644 86,4 82,9 
35 Colombia 1988 74,3 0,493   
36 Congo, dem. rep (Zaire) 1970 53,2 0,261   
37 Cote d'Ivoire 1974 41,5 0,128  42,3 
38 Costa Rica 1963 73,9 0,495 78,2 80,6 
39 Cyprus 1960    62,0 
40 Cyprus 1985 59,8 0,289   
41 Czechoslovakia 1921 63,3 0,329   
42 Denmark 1919 52,2 0,204   
43 Denmark 1933 47,5 0,176   
44 Denmark 1959 44,2 0,141 45,8 43,0 
45 Denmark 1989 42,8 0,138   
46 Dominican Republic 1960 74,5 0,542 80,3  
47 Ecuador 1954 80,4 0,671 86,4 84,0 
48 Ecuador 1974 77,2 0,552   
49 Egypt 1915 73,0 0,538   
50 Egypt 1930 70,3 0,485   
51 Egypt 1961 63,3 0,343 67,4 54,9 
52 El Salvador 1961 78,3 0,624 82,7 82,1 
53 Estonia 1925 42,1 0,126   
54 Ethiopia 1977 42,4 0,135   
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55 Finland 1929 39,2 0,091   
56 Finland 1959 33,8 0,084 35,1 49,4 
57 France  1930 62,9 0,317   
58 France 1963 50,2 0,187  54,4 
59 France 1988 54,6 0,226   
60 Gabon 1974 40,2 0,133   
61 Germany 1907 70,4 0,433   
62 Germany 1925 70,5 0,431   
63 Germany, fed. rep 1960 52,4 0,211 66,8 55,4 
64 Germany, fed. rep 1971 49,4 0,178   
65 Ghana 1970 53,0 0,226   
66 Greece 1971 47,0 0,166  45,4 
67 Greece 1993 53,9 0,226   
68 Guadeloupe 1969 60,0 0,323   
69 Guatemala 1950   86,0  
70 Guatemala 1964 77,0 0,601  85,3 
71 Guinea  1989 45,2 0,151   
72 Guyana 1989 63,9 0,399   
73 Haiti 1971 46,2 0,170   
74 Honduras 1952 70,6 0,461 75,7 76,5 
75 Honduras 1993 65,3 0,420   
76 India 1960 56,6 0,294 52,2 61,4 
77 India 1986 57,9 0,252   
78 Indonesia 1963 52,7 0,265  55,5 
79 Indonesia 1973 47,1 0,202   
80 Indonesia 1993 45,4 0,180   
81 Iran 1960   62,5 62,3 
82 Iran 1988 67,7 0,375   
83 Iraq 1958 82,0 0,673 88,2 72,6 
84 Ireland 1930 55,3 0,234   
85 Ireland 1960 57,5 0,254 59,4  
86 Israel 1970 69,8 0,468  80,0 
87 Italy 1930 71,5 0,471   
88 Italy 1960 62,0 0,345 73,2 74,3 
89 Italy 1990 73,3 0,500   
90 Jamaica 1961 75,7 0,580 77,0 80,3 
91 Japan 1909 40,0 0,126   
92 Japan 1930 39,0 0,118   
93 Japan 1960 39,8 0,108 47,0 43,2 
94 Japan 1980 50,3 0,139   
95 Japan 1995 51,1 0,205   
96 Jordan 1983 64,3 0,348  67,7 
97 Kenya 1960 76,2 0,589 69,2 75,0 
98 Kenya 1974 63,1 0,374   
99 Korea, rep. 1961   38,7 34,0 
100 Korea, rep. 1970 30,7 0,078   
101 Korea, rep. 1990 37,2 0,103   
102 Kuwait 1970 72,5 0,456   
103 Laos 1998 38,2 0,107   
104 Latvia 1925 50,4 0,191   
105 Lesotho 1960 38,1 0,123   
106 Lesotho 1990 41,1 0,144   
107 Liberia 1971 68,1 0,441   
108 Libya 1960   70,0  
109 Lithuania 1930 44,0 0,144   
110 Luxembourg 1950   63,8  
111 Madagascar 1960    80,4 
113 Malaysia 1960 68,0 0,454 47,3 64,0 
114 Mali 1960 45,1 0,156 47,7 47,8 
115 Malta 1960 50,2 0,189 47,8  
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116 Mauritius 1930 74,2 0,659   
117 Mexico  1960   69,4 60,7 
118 Morocco 1962 57,7 0,263   
119 Mozambique 1999 36,8 0,108   
120 Myanmar 1993 46,3 0,163  44,3 
121 Nepal 1971 54,2 0,280   
122 Netherlands 1921 66,2 0,310   
123 Netherlands 1930 56,8 0,249   
124 Netherlands 1959 55,7 0,236 57,9 50,5 
125 New Zealand 1910 78,6 0,589   
126 New Zealand 1918 77,6 0,525   
127 New Zealand 1930 76,2 0,527   
128 New Zealand 1960 69,6 0,437 73,4 76,4 
129 New Zealand 1972 71,2 0,468   
130 Nicaragua 1963 75,9 0,528 80,1  
131 Niger 1980 31,2 0,070   
132 Norway 1929 60,0 0,282   
133 Norway 1959 36,2 0,098 67,6 39,1 
134 Pakistan 1961 44,7 0,166 65,0 55,6 
135 Pakistan 1989 55,0 0,244   
136 Panama 1960 69,9 0,429 73,5 80,4 
137 Panama 1990 82,2 0,655   
138 Paraguay 1961 86,3 0,849  85,7 
139 Paraguay 1991 84,9 0,803   
140 Peru 1961 85,4 0,818 93,3 92,3 
141 Peru 1994 81,1 0,714   
142 Philippines 1950 48,2 0,220   
143 Philippines 1960 48,8 0,195 53,4 56,0 
144 Philippines 1991 54,7 0,238   
145 Poland 1960 51,1 0,204 46,5  
146 Portugal 1968 75,6 0,554  71,8 
147 Portugal 1989 73,5 0,527   
148 Puerto Rico 1930 69,9 0,469   
149 Puerto Rico 1959 70,7 0,468 73,8  
150 Puerto Rico 1987 73,4 0,504   
151 Reunion 1972 63,4 0,377   
152 Romania 1930 43,3 0,183   
153 Saudi Arabia 1972 74,2 0,513   
154 Senegal 1960 46,7 0,162  49,3 
155 Senegal 1998 47,8 0,173   
156 Sierra Leone 1970 42,4 0,131   
157 Singapore 1973 29,1 0,081   
159 Slovenia 1991 56,2 0,236   
160 South Africa 1927 62,8 0,323   
161 South Africa 1960 64,3 0,336 70,0  
162 Spain 1960 79,1 0,610 79,7 84,5 
163 Spain 1989 80,2 0,636   
164 Sri Lanka 1961 62,3 0,358  65,7 
165 Swaziland 1971 83,5 0,776   
166 Sweden 1919 57,3 0,246   
167 Sweden 1961 48,8 0,182 50,6 45,6 
168 Switzerland 1929 54,3 0,230   
169 Switzerland 1969 50,4 0,192  50,0 
170 Syria 1971 64,3 0,338   
171 Taiwan  1920 53,9 0,227   
172 Taiwan  1960 39,0 0,136 46,3  
173 Tanzania 1960    79,0 
174 Thailand 1963 44,4 0,145 46,0 42,6 
175 Thailand 1993 44,7 0,154   
176 Togo 1961 45,2 0,150   
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177 Togo 1970 51,0 0,206   
178 Trinidad and Tobago 1963 69,1 0,446 69,1  
179 Tunisia 1961 61,6 0,314  64,6 
180 Turkey 1927 56,3 0,256   
181 Turkey (in deunums) 1960 60,8 0,294 59,2 59,5 
182 Turkey 1991 58,5 0,274   
183 Uganda 1963 48,1 0,176  54,9 
184 Uganda 1991 57,4 0,277   
185 UK (England and Wales) 1921 62,6 0,308   
186 UK (Scotland) 1925 64,6 0,327   
187 UK (Northern Ireland) 1925 58,9 0,269   
188 UK 1960 68,7 0,399 72,3 67,7 
189 UK 1993 64,4 0,340   
190 Uruguay 1937 77,5 0,563   
191 Uruguay 1960 79,1 0,591 82,6 81,3 
192 USA 1910 57,1 0,253   
193 USA 1930 60,1 0,305   
194 USA 1959 67,7 0,411 71,0 73,1 
195 USA 1987 71,9 0,456   
196 Venezuela 1956   90,9 91,7 
197 Venezuela 1961 85,7 0,819   
198 Vietnam (South) 1960 56,2 0,253 58,7  
199 Vietnam 1994 47,4 0,184   
200 Yugoslavia 1950   43,7  
201 Zambia 1971 69,9 0,476   
Sources: Institut International d’Agriculture (IIA), International Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics 1932-1933, 
Rome; Various issues of the decennial FAO, Report on the World Census of Agriculture, Rome; Taylor, C.L., 
Hudson, M.C. (1972) World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, 2nd edition, Yale University Press: 
New Haven, London; Deininger, K., Olinto P. (1999) Asset distribution, inequality, and growth, World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper No. 2375   












   = 0,865    
Where xi and xj are the percentage shares of land of n deciles (n = 10) and µ is 1/n.    
 






ln/ln  = 0,823 
 
Where pi is the ith share of farms and xi is the ith share of land of n deciles (n = 10)  
 
Table A.2:  Calculation of Gini- and Theil-coefficient of land inequality (Chile 1965)  
 number of holdings total area in hectares Average size per holding 
less than 1 ha 51.000 22.000 0,43 
1 to 2 ha 34.699 46.100 1,33 
2 to 5 ha 43.761 138.500 3,16 
5 to 10 ha 33.076 230.300 6,96 
10 to 20 ha 29.976 413.800 13,80 
20 to 50 ha 29.360 911.900 31,06 
50 to 100 ha 14.785 1.022.500 69,16 
100 to 200 ha 9.164 1.261.500 137,66 
200 to 500 ha 6.998 2.167.500 309,73 
500 to 1000 ha 3.156 2.143.400 679,15 
1000 ha and over 3.324 22.286.230 6704,64 
total  259.299 30.643.730 118,18 
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 Decile distribution of holdings  Decile distribution of land Distribution in percentages  
1st decile    25930 11185 0,000365 
2nd decile   25930 11957 0,000390 
3rd decile    25930 34450 0,001124 
4th decile 25930 67543 0,002204 
5th decile 25930 82788 0,002702 
6th decile 25930 180544 0,005892 
7th decile 25930 310357 0,010128 
8th decile 25930 615528 0,020087 
9th decile 25930 1243425 0,040577 
10th decile 25930 28085952 0,916532 
Total 259300 30643730 1,00 
Notes: The gini- and theil-coefficients of land distribution are compiled from tables that have divided the total 
number of farm-holdings into land size classes, measured by hectares per holding. From these tables a decile 
distribution can be obtained. The decile distribution is imputed into the formula for the gini- and theil-
coefficient. Source: FAO, Report on the World Census of Agriculture 1960, Table 1.4, 2.3 and 2.10; pp. 26, 42 
and 55 respectively   
 
Table A.3: Descriptive statistics of variables explaining land inequality    
 
  MIN MAX MEDIAN MEAN ST.DEV OBS 
MEANTEMP -0,200 29,300 22,500 19,613 7,426 91 
BANANAS 0,000 0,126 0,000 0,015 0,029 97 
COTTON 0,000 0,263 0,000 0,023 0,052 97 
SUGAR 0,000 0,330 0,000 0,020 0,044 98 
COCOA DUMMY 0,000 1,000 0,000 0,171 0,379 105 
COFFEE DUMMY 0,000 1,000 0,000 0,276 0,449 105 
RUBBER DUMMY 0,000 1,000 0,000 0,067 0,251 105 
TOBACCO DUMMY 0,000 1,000 0,000 0,257 0,439 105 
RICE 0,000 0,574 0,008 0,092 0,147 101 
LNPOPDENSE 3,731 14,581 9,774 9,831 1,874 95 
EURCOL DUMMY 0,000 1,000 1,000 0,686 0,466 105 
IBERCOL DUMMY 0,000 1,000 1,000 0,219 0,416 105 
LNSETMORT 0,000 7,986 4,180 2,960 2,362 84 
LNCATHOLICISM 0,000 4,605 2,639 2,428 1,841 105 
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  MNTP BAN COT SUG COC COF RUB TOB MAI RIC WHE POPD EUR IBR SETM CATH 
MEANTEMP 1,00                
BANANAS 0,35 1,00               
COTTON 0,31 -0,04 1,00              
SUGAR 0,31 0,53 -0,04 1,00             
COCOA DUMMY 0,37 0,33 0,04 0,42 1,00            
COFFEE DUMMY 0,40 0,47 0,07 0,47 0,57 1,00           
RUBBER DUMMY 0,27 0,14 -0,02 0,13 0,08 -0,08 1,00          
TOBACCO DUMMY 0,01 0,06 -0,11 -0,02 -0,04 -0,02 0,02 1,00         
MAIZE 0,27 0,00 0,83 -0,04 0,01 0,03 -0,03 -0,06 1,00        
RICE 0,46 0,45 0,21 0,27 0,50 0,44 0,18 0,01 0,17 1,00       
WHEAT -0,52 -0,21 -0,20 -0,28 -0,25 -0,32 -0,16 -0,06 0,09 -0,31 1,00      
LNPOPDENSE 0,03 -0,21 -0,04 -0,15 -0,14 -0,26 0,20 -0,02 -0,15 -0,05 0,00 1,00     
EURCOL DUMMY 0,71 0,36 0,26 0,31 0,31 0,37 0,10 0,02 0,20 0,36 -0,54 -0,28 1,00    
IBERCOL DUMMY 0,25 0,47 -0,06 0,52 0,37 0,60 -0,14 0,06 0,01 0,17 -0,13 -0,41 0,36 1,00   
LNSETMORT 0,77 0,41 0,36 0,32 0,47 0,57 0,10 -0,07 0,32 0,51 -0,52 -0,23 0,90 0,37 1,00  
LNCATHOLICISM -0,09 0,36 -0,06 0,28 0,20 0,34 -0,18 0,00 0,04 0,08 0,25 -0,40 0,07 0,54 0,02 1,00 
 
Table A.4: Descriptive statistics of variables explaining income inequality  
  MIN MAX MEDIAN MEAN ST.DEV OBS LNDGI LNDTH GDPPC MINR EXPRR DEM SOC 
LANDGINI 0,291 0,863 0,620 0,601 0,152 105 1,00       
LANDTHEIL 0,070 0,849 0,294 0,339 0,203 97 0,96 1,00      
LNGDPPC 2,721 4,366 3,595 3,586 0,487 100 0,22 0,24 1,00     
LNMINERALS 0,000 4,554 0,000 1,098 1,772 103 0,24 0,28 -0,22 1,00    
RISKEXPROP 2,200 10,000 6,800 6,864 2,219 91 -0,06 -0,02 0,80 -0,40 1,00   
DEMOCRACY 1,000 6,000 3,000 3,520 1,572 90 0,16 0,13 0,76 -0,26 0,69 1,00  
SOCIALIST DUMMY 0,000 1,000 0,000 0,095 0,295 105 -0,28 -0,27 -0,03 -0,20 -0,05 -0,14 1,00 
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